Drawing on fifteen years of experience as a practitioner of doing philosophy in primary (ages 3-11) and secondary (ages 11-18) school classrooms, I will describe and attempt to justify (appealing to ownership and philosophical dialectic) two broad, over-arching principles, presence and absence: the extent to which a facilitator influences (presence) or deliberately refrains from influencing (absence) philosophical enquiry. While it is expected that the facilitator will and should be present in the discussion, this paper pays special attention to the extent to which a facilitator judges that presence appropriate.
what they said has any links or connections with what Student B said, the facilitator is present (in this case with regard to process) insofar as s/he has highlighted the possibility of a connection between ideas; and is absent insofar as s/he has not said (and may be consciously and deliberately withholding from saying) what the connection is, or said what the ideas were, or in any way led them to a particular evaluated, substantive answer. If, when working with a nursery class (ages 3 and 4 years), a facilitator provides 'a position' using a teddy bear ('Teddy says that it's not fair') or provokes a response by having the teddy bear cut the cake in a certain way (in a discussion about fair distribution for example), then the facilitator is present in that s/he is providing content to the discussion, but is absent in that s/he not trying to instruct them (and may be consciously and deliberately withholding from instructing them) as to what answer to give to the question. S/he is attempting to provide, perhaps due to prior unsuccessful attempts, what is needed to get the right kind of cognitive or emotional response from the children, in this case, a response that evokes their notion of fairness, whatever that may be.
The cursory justifications I gave above for looking to these two principles foundationally appealed to 'ownership' and 'philosophical content and direction', so, I need to say something more about these.
Ownership and absence
In order for children to be able to do philosophy at all they need to know what they are saying and why they are saying it in the context of the discussion they're engaged in. They need to have something of a 'synoptic view' of the discussion (McCabe 2006) .
To return to the opening metaphor, having a sense of where one has been and where one is (or may) be going in the labyrinth is among the most difficult things to achieve in a philosophical conversation-with children or adults. In this regard, a central aim of a philosophical enquiry with children is to maximise, according to the group's age and ability, the children's grasp of a synoptic view, and children are much more likely to gain any kind of synoptic view of the conversation by owning it. By 'owning ', I mean that the conversation should contain their arguments and ideas, expressed using their language, register and concepts, that they should respond to each other due to their own authentic, internal motivations to do so, that they understand these motivations and their own intuitive responses to their peers, and that they recognise their intellectual responsibility within the discussion. Though this kind of ownership is necessary in order that children are able to approach philosophy, it is not sufficient.
Ownership should be valued by a facilitator of philosophy-with-children insofar as it aids the children in their understanding of a philosophical problem or insofar as it makes philosophy approachable and accessible to them, and because it encourages transfer of their thinking into their lives, not (when doing philosophy anyway) as the end. In other words, that a conversation had by children is 'owned' by them does not in and of itself make it philosophical. One further point is that it is not necessary for children to have chosen the starting question, or indeed the philosophical theme, subject or issue, for it to be thought that they own the conversation. The distinction between having determined the content or starting point of a conversation and having a significant role in determining its progress and nature is often conflated, resulting in a common misconception of ownership and philosophical dialogues: we should be concerned with ownership within a philosophical conversation not construed as philosophical conversation.
Having said something about why a facilitator should aspire to absence, this last point-that ownership is not sufficient for a conversation to be philosophical-brings me to why they should also aspire to presence.
Dialectic and presence
The facilitator is present insofar as s/he helps the conversation remain philosophical and focused. I maintain that there is a particular focus that the facilitator can systematically help with in a philosophical conversation and that is the dialectical focus. I, therefore, take as my framework a dialectical framework of doing philosophy such as that practiced by Socrates and Plato and outlined by McCabe (2006 , and other considerations such as how the participants relate to each other as people. So, if my recommendation for the facilitator to simply facilitate 'moves', as one may do while playing chess, seems over-reductive, bear in mind that in this paper I am only focusing on this aspect, which is necessarily informed by the logic of the conversation; I am not limiting philosophical conversation to it. I do contend, however, that a quality philosophical conversation should contain the dialectical aspect and that this framework prescribes that a group engaged in philosophical investigation follow the argument, that 'whatever direction the argument blows us, that's where we must go' (Plato Rep. 394d, in Cooper 1997) . So, according to this framework, the facilitator's role will be determined (in addition to other considerations not addressed in this paper) and justified by the demands and rules of dialectical discourse, or, where the argument blows. This normative dimension can be modeled to the children by the facilitator and then even practised by the children themselves.
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The ancient educational framework known as 'Trivium', which has been somewhat recently revived (Kessels, Boers & Mostert 2009 , Robinson 2013 , characterises education as having three dimensions: grammar (knowledge), dialectic (enquiry), rhetoric (persuasion). What I have described as 'historical' and 'traditional' dimensions of philosophy could be thought of as falling under the grammar dimension, what one would learn following a history of ideas course, the 'expository' dimension under rhetoric. One may also think of philosophy as dividing into method and content (dialectic being primarily concerned with the former), but I sometimes want to add that there is an unsystematic pondering (or responsive) aspect to philosophy, too; where it all begins. if they cannot answer the question for which the teacher is seeking the answer. This is also especially a problem in a philosophical enquiry if the children are looking to the teacher/facilitator to provide substantive and definitive answers to the question, particularly if they do so, not by asking the teacher explicitly, but by 'fishing' for an answer from the teacher by answering with a GWIMH mindset ('Is it … Paris?'). This is problematic because the very nature of a philosophical problem entails that either the teacher has no substantive or definitive answer, or, if they do, it is only a 'candidate answer' like those of the children, as open to critical examination as any other. And, given that a well-facilitated philosophical enquiry will typically not have the children responding in a GWIMH way, once we identify why this is the case (one aim of this paper), philosophical facilitation has something to offer teachers and facilitators of any subject with regard to dialectical focus and question-style.
GWIMH questioning and open and closed questions
If there is a particular correct answer which the teacher is seeking, such as trachea we take what would appear to be a straightforwardly closed question such as 'What is the answer to 2 + 2?', a teacher with a closed question mindset (CQM) would be looking for one answer, '4', and will probably not probe much more for further information. An OQM teacher would be looking only for the answers the children offer and would certainly probe for more information, such as finding out why the answer that was given was given. The following contrasting examples illustrate the difference rather starkly but plausibly. We may now be able to draw a picture that illustrates the kind of psychological shift required to move from CQM to OQM. All of these examples share in requiring only that the respondent reports their own authentic cognitive content (ideas, thoughts, concerns, confusions, responses etc.) whether correct, incorrect, or neither within the context of a certain dialectical structure (e.g. 'I think it is the same thing', which implies the following dialectical demand: to provide a reason or account for why they think it the same). In virtue of meaning) to understand the meaning beyond what was actually said (assuming that he is not willfully failing to infer the illocutionary meaning). Here, a gap between intention and utterance has resulted in a misunderstanding and some social discord between the two men.
In order to begin to consider the second of the two common psychological mindsets I mentioned earlier, 'Guess-what's-in-your-head' questioning/inferring, imagine a classroom scene in which a child makes a claim, 'It's a bird, so it flies'. I shall now employ the analytic tool of formal argumentation to analyse the child's claim. But before I do, I'd like to make an important distinction between descriptive and intentional use of formal argumentation. Intentional use is when the person expressing the idea in an argument-form does so intentionally, for instance, a philosophy professor constructing an argument for a paper or presentation, conscious of what is the conclusion and what are the premises and how they might link. Descriptive use is when an observer of an idea presented represents that idea in argument-form whether or not the originator of the idea intended to do so, or is even aware that this can be done. This is often the case when children's ideas are represented, as not only do the children not generally intend to structure their idea within standard argument form, they generally do not even know that such a systematic discourse exists. I mention this because, as you will see, the application of this system of discourse to statements and claims made by those not intending standard-form structures can be problematic when one attempts to infer any implied meaning. So, with this distinction in mind I'll Another possibility is that the child, without yet being aware of it, holds contradictory beliefs (this is especially possible if the child is very young): 
Excavating and 'the absence test'
In order to demonstrate OQM, a teacher/facilitator refrains from assuming or prejudging the hidden premise; instead, they elicit from the child, through careful OQM questioning, what his or her beliefs/ideas/thoughts are so that the child is invited to make as explicit as they are able, and in his or her own words, the nature of their argument and the content of any hidden premise(s). However, it must be noted that the student reporting his or her own cognitive content may be in one of a number of cognitive states: for example, they may or may not be aware of what the hidden premise is (or indeed what a hidden premise is), they may or may not be aware of any premises at all, or simply not able to articulate them. For this reason, the teacher/facilitator ought to attempt to 'reveal' these hidden aspects through questioning, rather than attempting to 're-construct' them with phrases like, 'So, what you're saying is …' (where what follows the ellipsis is not the student's own words but those of the teacher/facilitator). For examples of the kind of questions and questioning strategies they should use to do this, refer to the previous section 'Opening up' or to Worley (2015a , 2015b . In this respect, the teacher/facilitator is like an archeologist. The archeologist tries to unearth artefacts carefully and to preserve not only the artefact but also the way in which the artefact is found. In the case of the teacher-questioner, a commitment to excavate means that if the student is unable, even after careful questioning (presence), to articulate the hidden premise(s), implication(s) or entailment(s) of what they have said, then the OQM teacher/facilitator accepts this (absence), resisting the temptation to re-construct, on the student's behalf, the hidden aspects of their reasoning. However, there are other things the facilitator can do 4 I have not called this a premise because it is not functioning as part of the argument, it is simply a belief the child has that he or she may not even be aware of until made aware of it. This raises interesting questions about the nature of a premise: does it need to be something that the arguer is aware of? If not, must it be a belief the arguer holds? And what counts as holding a belief? (presence) by inviting the group to consider the idea. Challenges, re-constructions, paraphrases (and so on) that help the child articulate him-or her-self better may well come from the group in the course of a natural, peer-group-centred dialogue. This is what the facilitator is working towards: for the group to recognise a problem for themselves (McCabe 2006 ) and begin to articulate it; careful 'excavation' of the students' contributions when deemed necessary so that the idea is articulated as well as it can be by the student and in their own words; so that it is not unduly influenced or 'coloured' by the facilitator beyond the dialectical demands (see McCabe's outline of these demands), and to hand over to the group as often as possible so that they enter into critical engagement with one another whilst developing and retaining a synoptic To be clear, Oyler only draws upon three practitioners, and is tentative about what we can conclude from them, however, he has chosen what he calls 'expert teachers', and, given that he draws some general principles from these experts, this implies some kind of exemplary practice. For more evidence, type in 'P4C' into a video search engine and view a few P4C sessions: it is my claim that you will see plenty of evidence that paraphrasing is standard practice. Though only anecdotal, in fifteen years I've seen very few-if any-examples of facilitation of philosophy with children that did not make use of paraphrasing as one default response to children's contributions. 6 I have no idea what the tone was of the example used from Oyler. I am also not suggesting that it did close the student down on the occasion that it was used in Oyler's example, just that this phrase often does have that effect, especially if accompanied with the said tone. at least that it be used carefully). My recommendation is to minimise (not necessarily eliminate) its use, according to need and impact. So natural is paraphrasing though, that a conscious and deliberate effort is usually required from the facilitator to monitor (presence) or omit (absence) its use, hence the need to appeal to the Ariadnian notions of presence and absence. It is to this extent that absence can be, like presence, understood to be an active principle.
Conclusion
The (advanced or beginning) facilitator's perennial dilemma is concerned with how much s/he should intervene in a philosophical enquiry and how much s/he should refrain from doing so. Drawing a metaphor from the ancient Greek mythical character of Ariadne, I have tried to help the facilitator with this dilemma by outlining two yinand-yang-like principles: presence, the mindful interventions within a dialogue, and absence, the mindful refraining of interventions within a dialogue. The facilitator, aware of the demands of each, is urged to take a middle way between them, attending to the dialectical needs of the dialogue and the group while minimising-though not eliminating-interventions and influence over the discussion with regard to both content and process. In order to achieve this balance, the facilitator avoids an attitude of mind I have called 'Closed Question Mindset' (typically 'Guess-what's-in-my-head' questioning and 'Guess-what's-in-your-head' questioning/inferring) and adopts an 'Open Question Mindset', where s/he elicits the intention of the students rather than merely their surface meaning or implications. Through the 'excavation'-style of questioning, the facilitator provides the students with opportunities to reveal their intended meaning before premature assumptions are made about them. This is done that the students can better understand themselves and each other without facilitators having to reach for their own interpretations, distillations, summaries, signposts and paraphrases to help the dialogue along; in other words, without the facilitator doing the work for them and thereby risking misinterpretation, taking the enquiry from the children into the facilitator's own hands.
